This paper explores the relationship between financial performance and macroeconomic fundamentals in emerging market economies not only in times of crises, but in general during crisis and non-crisis years over the global financial cycle. Using a panel framework with data for 119 emerging market economies at an annual frequency, we examine whether the relationship between performance and fundamentals varies in magnitude and/or switches sign between crisis and non-crisis years. We find that better macroeconomic fundamentals (such as a stronger net foreign asset positions and higher stocks of foreign exchange reserves) are associated with better financial performance not just during crisis episodes, but also during normal times. Quantitatively, the impact of fundamentals on performance is smaller during normal times than during crisis years, but works in the same direction and is statistically significant. The results are consistent with those of recent empirical studies on the link between financial performance and fundamentals during episodes of global financial stress, but generalizes the results to the global financial cycle.
Introduction
In May 2013, then Fed chairman Ben Bernanke mentioned in congressional testimony that the Fed would begin to curtail, or "taper", the asset purchase program commonly known as QE3. In subsequent post-meeting statements, the Fed rea¢ rmed their commitment to tapering the asset purchase program.
Many had concluded that asset purchase programs like QE3 led to extraordinary capital in ‡ows into many emerging market and developing countries, placing upward pressure on their exchange rates. In turn, this upward pressure was manifested in either exchange rate appreciation or expanding central bank reserves. Later on, the thought of a curtailment in programs like QE3 led to the expectation of a reversal in capital ‡ows into these countries. Expecting currency depreciation and falling asset prices, private capital began to ‡ee many emerging markets at the mere suggestion of tapering, and many emerging markets experienced a near-crisis episode, dubbed the "taper tantrum", in the summer of 2013.
During the taper tantrum episode in 2013, certain countries were deemed by the market to be particularly vulnerable to a reversal in capital ‡ows, and thus su¤ered larger declines in currency and asset values. In particular, the "fragile …ve" were the group of 5 large emerging market countries with relatively weak macroeconomic fundamentals (Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey, and South Africa). The thought was that these countries depended on positive net capital in ‡ows to …nance their current account de…cits, so the possible reversal in capital ‡ows may hit them particularly hard (see e.g. Ahmed, Coulibaly, and Zlate (2015) ; Aizenman, Binici, and Hutchison (2014) ; Mishra, Moriyama, and N'Diaye (2014) ).
While the e¤ect of macroeconomic fundamentals (such as the current account balance) on exchange rate performance during crisis episodes has been relatively well-studied, less is known about how fundamentals a¤ect exchange rate performance and exchange rate pressure during normal, non-crisis times. If countries with weaker fundamentals underperform their piers with stronger fundamentals during a crisis, do they also underperform during normal times? Or, on the contrary, are weaker fundamentals only seen as leading to vulnerability during a crisis, but are ignored by the market and private capital ‡ows during non-crisis times? This paper examines the relationship between …nancial performance and macroeconomic fundamentals in emerging market economies that is observed not only in times of crises, but in general during crisis and non-crisis years over the global …nancial cycle. 1 Our paper attempts to answer these questions by exploring the relationship between …nancial performance and macroeconomic fundamentals over the cycle, rather than just during speci…c crisis episodes. Using a panel econometric speci…cation with annual data, we examine the link between …nancial performance (i.e., currency appreciation and appreciation pressure) and macroeconomic fundamentals (i.e., the current account balance, the net foreign asset positions, the stock of foreign exchange reserves, GDP growth, and in ‡ation). In addition, we use interacted terms between macroeconomic fundamentals and a "crisis year" dummy variable to determine whether the relationship between macroeconomic fundamentals and …nancial performance is robust, varies in magnitude, or switches signs between crisis and non-crisis years.
We …nd that better macroeconomic fundamentals, such as a stronger net foreign asset position and a higher stock of foreign exchange reserves, are associated with better …nancial performance not just during crisis episodes, but also during normal times. Quantitatively, the impact of fundamentals on …nancial performance is larger during the crisis years themselves than outside of crisis years, but the coe¢ cient is still positive and statistically signi…cant during normal times. Thus, countries with relatively stronger fundamentals su¤ered less currency depreciation and depreciation pressure during an episode like the global …nancial crisis in the fall and winter of 2008-09, a …nding which is consistent with Ferretti and Razin (2000) , Rose and Spiegel (2011), Frankel and Saravelos (2012) , and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011, 2012) . However, we …nd that countries with stronger fundamentals also experienced more currency appreciation and appreciation pressure during normal times, such as during the 2009 recovery.
Our approach has a number of advantages over those used in the afore-mentioned studies.
First, we do not restrict our analysis to speci…c crisis episodes, but explore the robustness of the link between macroeconomic fundamentals and relative exchange rate performance over the cycle, during both booms and busts. A time …xed e¤ect in the panel data regression controls for global factors, allowing us to examine the role of country-speci…c factors in determining the relative performance across emerging markets. Second, instead of limiting our analysis to the behavior of capital ‡ows, we examine the performance of the …nancial markets a¤ected by these capital ‡ows (such as foreign exchange markets). Using …nancial variables as dependent variables allows much wider cross-sectional and cross-time coverage than it would be possible with other indicators like capital ‡ows. Third, we do not just consider the role of current account positions, as in most discussions of the …nancial performance in the "fragile …ve", but expand the analysis to consider the impact of other country-speci…c fundamentals, like the stock of external debt or foreign exchange reserves, on …nancial performance.
2 Interestingly, we …nd that while the stocks of certain type of assets, like external debt or central bank reserves, are important determinates of …nancial performance, other external assets, like portfolio equity or FDI, have less important roles.
Measuring …nancial performance at the annual frequency is the outcome of a trade-o¤ between precision in measuring …nancial performance and feasibility in constructing the panel dataset. On one hand, while good times are prolonged and smooth, crises are sort and with bounce-backs, so the annual data may not capture the full collapse of …nancial markets when some partial recovery happens within the same year. However, the …nding of stronger e¤ects of fundamentals during crises than non-crisis years, as discussed above, alleviates this concern. On the other hand, the use of annual performance allows for the construction of a panel dataset without arbitrarily choosing start and end dates for the boom and crisis episodes, which are not necessarily aligned across emerging market economies. The use of annual data also expands the sample coverage to 119 emerging market and developing economies.
Our paper may also shed some light on an apparent puzzle that prevails in the empirical literature on the link between fundamentals and …nancial performance during episodes of global …nancial stress. Namely, how does one reconcile that: (1) countries with worse fundamentals fare worse during stress episodes (see e.g. Ahmed, Coulibaly, and Zlate (2015) ; Mishra, Moriyama, and N'Diaye (2014) ); and (2) countries that receive more capital in ‡ows ex-ante also fare worse during such episodes (see e.g. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011, 2012 );
Eichengreen and Gupta (2014))? One possible explanation would have been that countries with worse fundamentals receive more capital in ‡ows during booms (and hence experience more appreciation) and su¤er more out ‡ows during crises (and hence experience more depreciation), which would have made (1) and (2) consistent with one another. However, this …rst explanation is not supported by our results, which suggest that countries with worse fundamentals not only su¤er greater net capital out ‡ows and underperform during crises, but also receive less net capital in ‡ows and underperform during booms. Another possible explanation would be that countries that initially have better fundamentals receive more in ‡ows during booms (and hence experience more appreciation), which erodes the strength of their fundamentals (e.g., their next foreign assets position deteriorates as they become more indebted); in turn, these countries experience larger out ‡ows during crisis (and hence su¤er more depreciation). In this version of events, relatively stronger fundamentals invite capital in ‡ows during good times, which then erode fundamentals and sow the seeds of destruction during crisis times. While our results are consistent with the second explanation, more research is needed to examine this topic. Finally section 5 concludes with a discussion of directions for further research.
Exchange rates and fundamentals in 2008-09
In this paper, we consider exchange rate ‡uctuations and exchange rate pressure for the sample of 119 emerging market and developing countries listed in Table 1 shows that although both groups of currencies tended to depreciate against the dollar during the crisis, the currencies of countries with below-median current account to GDP ratios tended to depreciate by more, underperforming those with above-median current accounts by around 2 percentage points at the height of the crisis. Also, by December 2009, currencies in countries with above-median current account ratios recovered relatively by more: they were about 3% lower than the pre-crisis peak, whereas those in countries with below-median current account ratios were still below the peak by as much as 7%.
Average exchange rates for the same sample are plotted in the top right-hand panel, but here the countries are divided into two groups based on those with above and below median levels of central bank foreign exchange reserves to GDP. The …gure shows the same pattern as in the previous one, i.e., during the crisis, a gap opened between the two groups, and this gap expanded during the subsequent recovery. Thus, countries with better fundamentals, i.e., a high stock of central bank foreign exchange reserves, outperformed those with worse fundamentals during both the crisis and the recovery periods.
Average exchange rates are also plotted in the lower left-hand panel, where countries are split into those with above and below the median net external debt assets to GDP. A gap between the two lines emerged during the crisis, as the currencies of countries with high amounts of external debt on average underperformed those of countries with less external debt during the crisis. However, this gap does not appear to widen during the recovery, suggesting that, unlike the current account or foreign exchange reserves, net external debt was not a major driver of relative exchange rate performance during the recovery.
Finally, the last chart in the …gure splits the sample of countries into those with above and below the median net external FDI assets to GDP ratio. Here, no gap emerges between the two lines during either the crisis or the recovery, suggesting that the net external FDI position was not a driver of relative exchange rate performance during either the crisis or the recovery period.
Econometric methodology and data
Our econometric speci…cation consists of simple regressions in a panel framework with annual data, in which the dependent variable measures …nancial performance and the explanatory variables re ‡ect the relative strength of macroeconomic fundamentals:
where F it is a measure of …nancial performance during year t, re ‡ecting either the change in the nominal exchange rate or an exchange rate pressure index, it 1 is a vector of lagged economic fundamentals, including the current account to GDP ratio, the net foreign asset position, GDP growth, and in ‡ation, and X t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if year t is deemed to be an "emerging market currency crisis year". The panel data speci…cation also includes country …xed e¤ects to control for unobserved country characteristics and time …xed e¤ects to control for time-variant global factors.
The net external assets to GDP ratio can be decomposed into central bank reserves, net external debt, and net external equity (both portfolio equity and FDI). 4 Thus, in an alternative speci…cation, we can treat each type of net external assets as a separate variable in it 1 .
The time …xed e¤ects control for time-variant global factors, which may determine for instance whether emerging market currencies on average appreciate or depreciate relative to the dollar in a given year. Thus, in this speci…cation, the components of and measure to what extent economic fundaments like the current account or the net foreign asset position a¤ect the relative …nancial performance across emerging markets. In addition, the interactions between each of these fundamentals and the crisis year dummy X t allow to distinguish between the e¤ect of fundamentals on the relative …nancial performance during normal, non-crisis times from the e¤ect during crisis times. Importantly, the components of tell us whether in normal times countries with better fundamentals experience more (or less) currency appreciation than countries with weaker fundamentals. Also, the components of show how the e¤ect of fundamentals on relative performance changes during crisis years, i.e., whether countries with better fundamentals fare even better during crisis years than those with weaker fundamentals.
Data
The panel dataset contains 119 developing and emerging market countries. The unbalanced panel consists of annual data, potentially from 1972 to 2011. The data on exchange rates, foreign exchange reserves, the current account, and the net foreign asset positions are from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) .
As dependent variables, in alternative speci…cations, we use either the change in the nominal exchange rate during the course of the year or the exchange rate pressure index.
The exchange rate pressure index is measured as the percent change in the nominal exchange rate minus the change in reserves. Thus, a downward movement in either the exchange rate or the pressure index indicates appreciation.
As explanatory variables, we use macroeconomic fundamentals such as the current account balance and the net external assets position (all normalized by GDP). We decompose net external assets into four components, i.e., net external debt, net external portfolio equity, net external FDI, and the stock of foreign exchange reserves. We also consider the roles of gross government debt, GDP growth, and in ‡ation as a potential fundamental variables driving exchange rate movements.
Descriptive statistics for each of the variables in the model are presented in Table 2 . The crisis indicator variable X t takes a value of 1 if the year is an "emerging market currency crisis" year and 0 otherwise. The crisis year is de…ned as a year of widespread emerging market currency crisis, rather than being country speci…c. As such, X t = 1 denotes a year when more than 5 percent of the countries in the sample su¤ered a currency crisis according to the Laeven and Valencia (2013) currency crisis index. Using this 5 percent cuto¤, the crisis years are 1981, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1998, and 1999 . The results are robust to cuto¤s between 3-to-7 percent. Above 7 percent, there are nearly no crisis years (1994 is the only crisis year when the cuto¤ is above 8 percent), whereas below 3 percent nearly every year is a crisis year.
Results
Before presenting the results from the multivariate regression, it is helpful to …rst visually examine the relation between the changes in exchange rates over a given year against economic fundamentals measures as of the beginning of that year. The corresponding scatter plots are presented in Figure 2 . Each scatter plot shows the country-year observations for the full sample; the blue solid line is the least-squares …t through the country-year observations for emerging market crisis years; the red dotted line is the least-squares projection through the country-year observations for years that were not emerging market crisis years.
Each of the four scatter plots shows a relationship between lagged fundaments and exchange rate performance in both crisis and non-crisis years. For the current account/GDP ratio, net external assets/GDP ratio, and central bank reserves/GDP ratio, the slope of the least squares …t is negative, indicating that a stronger current account or external assets position is associated with exchange rate appreciation. On the contrary, the slope of the …t line in the …gure with gross government debt/GDP is positive, indicating that higher amounts of government debt are associated with exchange rate depreciation.
The estimated slope coe¢ cients in these univariate regressions are presented in Table   3 . In nearly every case, the estimated slope is signi…cant and has the appropriate sign during both crisis years and non-crisis years. The one exception is the univariate regression involving the current account in crisis years, where the point estimate is large and has the expected sign, but the standard error is also large. In most cases, the absolute value of the slope during crisis years is larger than the absolute value of the slope during non-crisis years. The result suggests that the relation between lagged fundamentals and exchange rate performance from non-crisis years is preserved and actually ampli…ed during crisis years.
Results from the multivariate panel data regression
We present panel data results from the regression of …nancial performance in a given year on a set of macroeconomic fundamentals from the previous year. In alternative speci…cations, the dependent variables include either the change in exchange rates (Table 4) or the exchange rate pressure index (Table 5) , with a downward movement denoting appreciation or appreciation pressure. Among the explanatory variables, each table includes macroeconomic fundamentals such as the current account balance and the net external assets position, controls for GDP growth and in ‡ation, as well as time and country …xed e¤ects. The net external assets enter either in the aggregate (columns 2 and 3), split between foreign exchange reserves and nonreserve assets (columns 4 and 5), or split into net external debt assets, net external portfolio equity assets, net external FDI assets, and net foreign exchange reserves (columns 6 and 7).
For each set of controls in columns 2-7, the table shows results from regressions with the fundamentals included alone or interacted with the crisis dummy X t .
The results suggest that, without distinguishing between crisis and non-crisis years, better macroeconomic fundamentals are associated with better …nancial performance, with the latter de…ned as more currency appreciation (Table 4 ) and stronger upward pressure on exchange rates (Table 5) . In all speci…cations, faster lagged GDP growth and lower lagged in ‡ation are associated with more appreciation pressure.
When included as the only fundamental variable other than GDP growth and in ‡ation, the current account balance has a negative and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on relative performance, with a higher current account balance coinciding with greater exchange rate appreciation. This result also holds when net external assets (including reserves) are included in the regression. But when central bank reserves are included as a separate variable in the regression (columns 4-7 in Tables 4 and 5) , the current account no longer has a statistically signi…cant e¤ect on relative performance. The current account is statistically signi…cant in the …rst three columns, i.e., when net external assets are either excluded from the speci…-cation or they are included but as one term without separating out reserves. Once reserves enter as a separate variable, the current account loses signi…cance.
Furthermore, the results in columns 4 and 5 show that net external assets (excluding foreign exchange reserves) have a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on relative exchange rate performance. However, in columns 6 and 7, external assets are further decomposed into portfolio equity, FDI, and debt. In these speci…cations, debt is the only variable that has an e¤ect on relative exchange rate performance. The net external FDI or portfolio equity positions have no e¤ect on relative …nancial performance. This …nding echoes that in Schnabl (2004a, 2004b) , who argue that the stock of foreign currency-denominated assets is an important factor for exchange rate stabilization. Both FDI and portfolio equity tend to be denominated in the home currency, whereas in most emerging market countries, the stocks of external debt and central bank reserves are denominated in foreign currencies.
Distinguishing between crisis and non-crisis years, we …nd that macroeconomic fundamentals still a¤ect exchange rates in non-crisis years. Earlier we asked the crucial question of whether in normal, non-crisis times, do countries with stronger fundamentals experience more currency appreciation than countries with weaker fundamentals? We provide an answer to this question by including interactions between lagged fundamentals and X t , the emerging market crisis dummy, into the regression. In these speci…cations, the lagged fundamentals by themselves still have a statistically signi…cant e¤ect, suggesting that fundamentals a¤ect relative performance not only in a crisis year but in normal times as well.
Furthermore, the results show that during years characterized as "emerging market currency crisis" years, the e¤ect of economic fundamentals on relative performance across emerging market and developing countries is even larger than in normal years. For instance, in column 5 of Table 4 , a 1 percentage point increase in the stock of central bank reserves leads to a 0.158% relative appreciation in the exchange rate in a normal year, but a 0.392% (i.e., 0.158%+0.234%) relative appreciation during a crisis year. Thus, macroeconomic fundamentals explain some of the cross-country di¤erences in relative exchange rate performance during normal years, but their e¤ect is magni…ed during emerging market crisis years.
In Table 6 , we include the lagged gross government debt measured relative to GDP among the fundamentals, while using the speci…cation with foreign exchange reserves separated from next external assets. In the full sample of 119 emerging market economies, less government debt is associated with more exchange rate appreciation (columns 1-2) and more appreciation pressure (columns 3-4). However, the coe¢ cient on the interacted term between government debt and the crisis indicator is not statistically signi…cant, suggesting that the e¤ect is not distinguishable between crisis and non-crisis years.
Conclusion
The repeated experience of …nancial crises in emerging market economies shows that, during crisis episodes, certain macroeconomic fundamentals like the current account balance, the stock of external assets, or the stock of reserves are important determinants of the relative …nancial performance across countries. For example, during the recent taper tantrum episode in 2013, the emerging market economies with large current account de…cits (e.g., Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey, deemed the "fragile …ve") experienced signi…cant exchange rate depreciation relative to those emerging markets with current account surpluses.
Given the importance of fundamentals during crisis times, it is natural to ask whether these same fundamentals have an e¤ect on relative performance during normal times as well. We …nd that the answer is yes, they do. Thus, the stock of net external debt and the stock of central bank reserves seem to have robust and statistically signi…cant e¤ects on …nancial performance; in contrast, the stock of net external equity assets (either portfolio equity or FDI) do not seem to a¤ect relative performance. Also, while these fundamentals have qualitatively similar e¤ects on relative performance during normal times as during crisis times, we …nd that their e¤ect is quantitatively larger during crisis times.
As mentioned in the introduction, the joint …nding in the literature that (1) countries with worse fundamentals fare worse during stress episodes, and (2) countries that receive more capital in ‡ows ex-ante also fare worse during such episodes raises a potential puzzle.
The puzzle could have been explained if the same countries with worse fundamentals received more capital in ‡ows during booms (and hence experience more appreciation) and su¤ered more out ‡ows during crisis (and hence su¤er more depreciation). However, this scenario is not supported by our results, which suggest that fundamentals push relative exchange rate performance in the same direction during crisis years as during normal, non-crisis times.
Another possible explanation would be that countries that initially have better fundamentals receive more in ‡ows during booms (and hence experience more appreciation), which erodes the strength of their fundamentals (e.g., their net foreign assets position deteriorates as they become more indebted); in turn, these countries experience larger out ‡ows during crisis (and hence su¤er more depreciation). In this version of events, strong fundamentals invite capital ‡ows during good times, which then erode fundamentals and leave emerging markets vulnerable during crisis times. Consistent with the …ndings of this paper, the way that strong economic fundamentals may encourage harmful "capital ‡ow bonanzas" is an important direction for further research. n o te s: A ll in d e p e n d e nt va ria b le s a re la g g e d o n e ye a r. A ll re g re ssio n s h ave b o th tim e a n d c o u ntry …x e d e ¤e c ts. S ta n d a rd e rro rs a re in p a re nth e sis.
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